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Corporate apologia and the attribution of guilt 
 
Anne Marie Bülow-Møller 
 
This paper argues that in the difficult disciplines of crisis communication and 
image restoration, attribution theory has explanatory value. Corporate 
apologia – the explanations that an organisation offers after an attack on – 
differs with the type of crisis it is designed to diffuse, and if the crisis 
concerns legitimacy, the art is to shift the public attribution of guilt or 
responsibility. The case of Arla vs  Hirtshals is used to demonstrate how a 
concerted effort in impression management succeeded in just such a shift. 
 
 
 
In Public Relation circles there is a belief that having good 
stakeholder relations means Never Having to Say You’re Sorry.  
Since there is a steadily growing body of work about crisis 
management and image restoration vis-à-vis stakeholders that 
deals with ways of saying, if not exactly “sorry”, then “we are 
very concerned”, it must follow either that a large number of 
organisations have a less than perfect stakeholder 
communication programme, or that the truth is more 
complicated. 
Stakeholders, the different groups that have a vested interest, 
could be shareholders or customers of a company, or users of a 
product or neighbours to the plant where it is produced; when a 
company faces a crisis, it is normally the customers and the 
wider public that are addressed, as these are the groups that are 
most important for the company’s reputation and hence for its 
survival. 
Crisis management, and also its younger cousin, issues 
management, will normally entail that something untoward has 
happened, and that the organisation is being blamed for it by the 
public. The response can be analysed in terms of rhetorical 
skills, and recent literature has contributed to an understanding 
of the rhetorical base that supports the selection of frames in 
corporate communication (e.g. the anthology edited by Millar 
and Heath 2004). 
Classical rhetoric is not just communication that aims to 
persuade, i.e. to influence receivers to react in a particular way 
regarding a judgement to be made; it is also about changing 
receivers’ opinion about an event that has already taken place 
through explanation. The classical apologia is just such an 
explanation; it is not an apology (although it may contain one), 
it is “speaking in one’s own defence”. If stakeholders can be 
made to frame the event in a suitable way, i.e. to see the event 
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through the company’s eyes, they can be made to understand all, 
and forgive all. The literature in this subsection of crisis 
management is growing, with titles like “Corporate apologia” 
(Hearit 2001), “On organizational apologia” (Rowland and 
Jerome 2004) and Crisis management by apology (Hearit 2006); 
evidently the rhetorical angle attracts more interest than it used 
to. The question is how it works in practice. 
This study sets out to demonstrate some of the established 
ways of excusing and justifying unethical behaviour that is 
treated in the crisis management literature; and secondly, since 
this is normally neglected, also to look at the organisation’s 
image restoration strategy in terms of expected reader response. 
Theories of influence borrowed from social psychology will be 
used to predict shifts in reader opinion. In particular, the study 
will draw on the complex known as impression management, as 
parts of it are commonly used as a theoretical base for analysing 
receiver reactions. 
Impression management (IM) is the cover term used for the 
verbal and non-verbal tactics employed to actively construct a 
favourable image. As it will be outlined below, the theory 
encompasses other-focussed and self-focussed moves (attempts 
to please the receiver, or to enhance the speaker’s status in the 
eyes of the receiver), and it distinguishes between assertive and 
defensive measures (attempts to enhance the speaker’s 
reputation, or to defend him or her against an accusation). 
Analyses of IM are found mostly in organisational interaction, 
particularly in interviews, as a potent way of examining the 
sources of influence in organisations (Tedeschi 1990, Rosenfeld 
et al. 2002, Huczynski 2004). The defensive part of IM that is 
concerned with explanations and justifications, or accounts, has 
been particularly influential in the crisis literature. 
Finally, the theory of attribution, also borrowed from social 
psychology, will be applied. Attribution is the psychological 
process of ascribing traits to another participant in the 
interaction, and for organisational communication, the main 
problem is ascribing responsibility or guilt. Since this takes 
place from the point of view of the stakeholder, it allows us to 
perspectivise the analysis of attempted manipulation of 
impressions. 
 It will be argued that if the crisis concerns legitimacy and 
unethical behaviour, justification is not enough to restore 
reputation. To produce the desired shift in framing, the audience 
must be made to share some of the organisation’s concerns. On 
the basis of a particular restoration campaign in a major dairy 
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concern, this study will make a case for group affiliation as a 
major factor: it is arguable that in this case, it was the fostering 
of a sense of values shared with the customers that worked for 
the company. 
 
 
1. Apologia and Impression management 
 
Everyone tries to manage other people’s impressions of 
themselves, in order to present a competent and likeable front. 
Thus there are no necessary cynical implications at all, but since 
Goffman first used the term (Goffman 1959), it has been 
common to treat front-stage, on-purpose behaviour as a 
performance and hence somehow less genuine than back-stage, 
relaxed, and therefore more characteristic behaviour. In the case 
of companies, there is the added assumption that everything that 
comes out of the Public Relations department is a purposeful 
performance. In the following, the company will be treated 
much like a person, inasmuch as we are dealing with the 
company’s public persona, the “mask” or “figure” that carries 
the company’s image and reputation. The assumption is that if 
the company is being blamed for misbehaving, the attribution of 
guilt and responsibility will work in the same way as if a person 
had done it. 
As mentioned above, impressions need different kinds of 
management according to the goal, especially if defence is 
called for. In the crisis management literature, two scholars have 
dominated the discussion of organisational defence, viz. Benoit 
and Coombs (Benoit 1995, 1997, 2004; Brinson and Benoit 
1999; Coombs 1999, 2002; Coombs and Holladay 2002, 2004). 
However, as their typologies of defensive moves have common 
roots in the accounts literature (see e.g. Buttny 1993), no 
distinction needs to be made here. The list below will follow 
Coombs (1999) in terminology. 
 
 
1.1  Defensive types 
 
When an accusation has been levelled at a speaker (or an 
organisation for whom the person speaks), the accounts used to 
exonerate the speaker typically concentrate on efforts to 
minimise the implications of harm, responsibility, or breach of 
norms. In corporate apologia, in Coomb’s treatment, it is 
possible to distinguish apology, excuses, and justifications. 
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An apology entails that the speaker 
• Assumes responsibility for what happened 
• Expresses regret and accepts a possible punishment 
• Offers redress if damage has been done, and 
• Seeks forgiveness 
 
For organisations, this is clearly hard, especially at an early 
stage of a crisis, because legally speaking, accepting 
responsibility can be extremely costly. The organisation may 
offer redress, e.g. by helping villagers where a chemical plant 
has exploded, while insisting that they are doing it out of 
charity. Typical statements include regretful non-apologies like 
“We are truly appalled that a thing like this could happen at our 
plant, and doing everything we can to help.” 
 
Excuses are found when the speaker does not accept 
involvement. Here the speaker 
• Denies responsibility 
• Denies intention and volition 
• Denies agency and/or attempts scapegoating 
 
Typical excuses run “it wasn’t me”, “I didn’t mean to” and “I 
couldn’t possibly have known”. In organisations, this often 
means pointing to someone outside the organisation who is 
ultimately responsible, e.g. international regulations for safety 
procedures. But of course it is always possible to subdivide 
responsibility, so that there is a sliding scale into the next 
category, where a little responsibility is accepted. 
 
Justifications are very variegated. Here the speaker 
• Accepts responsibility, but 
• Denies that (much) harm was done, or claims that the 
victim deserved it 
• Re-frames or re-zones the problem,  
• Differentiates issues or agents, 
• Makes comparisons with others, not at present accused, 
• Denies a (small) part of the problem, or 
• Claims higher norm or fairness principle 
 
This is the ground where most organizations manage their 
crises, and they often rely on pragmatic inference for effect. For 
example, many accusations of malpractice are denied in very 
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restrictive terms, so that recipients themselves may infer the 
speaker’s innocence, while the legal damage has been 
minimized in case of forced future retractions. In Tour de 
France interviews an athlete may say, “The accusation that I 
used EPO is nonsense - I have never tested positive for EPO”. In 
strictly logical terms, it is presumably a fact that no positive test 
exists, but it is merely an inference that no positive test could 
have existed with more thorough testing.  
Typical moves for differentiation isolate a few individuals 
and point out that they are unlike the rest, “There are rotten 
apples in every organisation and we have fired the responsible 
manager”. In the case of comparatives, a farmer from an EU 
country could argue “We have no choice but to follow suit with 
practices we would rather avoid [e.g. conditions for animals 
transported to a slaughterhouse] because our competitors 
elsewhere in Europe have easier conditions”; re-zoning could be 
“There is no animal welfare issues here, for as we interpret the 
rules, we need not follow EU regulations for rest and water once 
we are on Russian territory, and therefore this is merely a case 
for international transport agreements”.  
Shifting the responsibility upwards in an honourable manner 
implies that a higher norm was applicable, like “We owed it to 
our shareholders/ the taxpayers/ the people who voted for us to 
adopt this procedure, as it was clearly in their best interest, 
although it was a painful decision to make”. This kind of move 
not only aims to minimise guilt and harm, but to point out that at 
least one group of stakeholders should be positively grateful. 
Flat denials, like “I don’t know what you are talking about, I 
never received any kickback from the contractors”, rely on fact. 
They are relatively easy to deal with, for as long as they are 
believed (or cannot be disproved in court). There are borderline 
cases: for example, it will be remembered that in President 
Clinton’s statement under oath, “I did not have sex with that 
woman”, this was actually a differentiation manoeuvre; in his 
definition, since he left the work to his partner, she had sex with 
him, but he did not have sex with her. Again, pragmatic 
inference is doing the work (i.e. if the speaker is innocent in his 
own definition, and if, as in normal circumstances, relevant 
information has been given in full cooperation, then he is also 
innocent in the receiver’s judgement.) 
 
 
1.2    Assertive types 
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Impression management that aims to induce the hearer to like or 
admire the speaker is divided into moves that focus on the 
recipient, and moves that focus on the speaker. Of the many 
subtypes treated in the IM literature, a few are particularly 
relevant for dealing with a crisis: 
 
• Ingratiation, which may mean 
• Opinion conformity (making the recipient feel 
knowledgeable) 
• Other-enhancement like Compliments (making the 
recipient feel good), and 
• Favours (making the recipient feel indebted). 
 
In terms of crisis response, this is the difficult operation of 
saying “We hear you, you are right, you have a point – but you 
are really wrong, for we were not at fault”. Favour doing, on the 
other hand, consists in the company making itself useful to the 
stakeholders by providing services; customers will not generally 
keep up a grudge against a company whose services they enjoy. 
On the self-boosting side, image building is very largely a 
matter of installing in others a favourable notion of a company 
through product satisfaction and pleasant associations with the 
corporate brand, like credibility, durability, fun etc., depending 
on the customer segment and stakeholder range. Self-
enhancement comes in varieties of: 
 
• Bolstering (claiming that speaker deserves credit on a 
number of scores) 
• Burying (suppressing unwanted information or 
memories) 
• Boosting (upgrading connections with the right sources 
of glamour or credibility) 
• Acclaiming (taking credit for a good idea), and 
• Being an Example, which is normally used about  ‘a 
shining example ’, i.e. a person who gathers credit by 
being seen to work hard, but which, in this context, 
could also mean ‘being a victim’, i.e. being seen to be hit 
by the same forces that are blamed for the rest of the 
damage done. 
 
In connection with crisis management and subsequent image 
restoration, bolstering moves are necessarily frequent: “Look 
what we have done for local employment / the charities we have 
sponsored / the local community we are part of”. For burying, 
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the easiest way of making people forget an unfortunate 
connection, e.g. having worked for Enron, is to retouch the 
mental photographs and remove all references to the connection 
from one’s web page, as a number of former employees, now 
senior US officials, have done. Another tactic is to have a 
standard phrase about “looking ahead after we have put difficult 
times behind us”: this is what is normally found in annual 
reports after a year of catastrophe, especially after a change of 
leadership. 
While the interest in corporate apologia has meant that the 
defensive moves have been widely discussed in the crisis 
literature, the notion of ingratiation was not much in evidence 
before Allen and Caillouet (1994). It is now commonly agreed 
that successful apologia has both a defensive side of justification 
and an assertive side that is closer to public relation efforts 
under normal conditions, i.e. drawing attention to the 
praiseworthy and attractive sides of the business. 
Corporate apologia, then, should be tailored according to the 
demands of the situation. In the following case, we shall 
examine the influence of the type of crisis, the alternative story 
that the company sought to tell, and the voice, or indeed voices, 
they chose for their persona. 
 
 
2. The case: the dairy company Arla Foods 
 
The Arla Foods Group is Europe’s second largest dairy company, 
employing 18,000 people. It is a co-operative owned at the time of 
the crisis by about 11,000 Danish and Swedish milk producers. 
Since milk is a low-involvement product, it used to be completely 
uncontroversial that the dairy company grew to monopoly size in 
Denmark, with just a handful of small, independent dairies left. 
Danish export of butter and cheese was a matter of national pride. 
But in the 1990’s the press started writing about unhealthy 
monopoly behaviour: there was the case of the sudden and 
dramatic price increase for large milk deliveries to hospitals and 
institutions, which drew an instant differentiation response when 
it was blamed on an inexperienced manager. Then there was the 
case of the small organic dairy producers who wished to leave the 
co-operative; for organic farmers, contracts were binding for 25 
months, as against the normal 12 months, with prohibitive fines 
for leaving.  
Organic milk became a problem in itself: not only did Arla 
make little effort to sell the surplus organic milk, it maintained the 
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sharp price difference that made organic milk prohibitively 
expensive and encouraged a return to industrial production to get 
rid of the over-production. Concern among customers was visible 
not only in the press coverage but also in letters to newspapers. 
Eventually Arla, the biggest producer of organic milk in the 
country, came to be seen as an enemy of organic farming that 
should be stopped, and legal intervention was rumoured. At this 
point many customers began looking for alternative milk cartons 
in their local supermarket. 
Though these stories were damaging to Arla’s popular image, 
they did not constitute a crisis. That, however, was the magnitude 
of the response that another event aroused: the near-monopoly’s 
efforts to strangle a small competitor. Late in 2003 Arla was taken 
to court for abusing its market position by illegally paying a large 
wholesaler to remove the products of a small organic dairy, 
Hirtshals, from their shelves. The media reported the court case 
and described the meeting where two Arla sales employees gave 
the wholesaler, Metro, what was called a “marketing subsidy”; the 
Metro purchasing manager joyfully e-mailed a friend, relating 
how she had secured a large marketing subsidy, in return for 
which she would kill the new Hirtshals contract at once. Long 
before Arla was eventually found guilty and fined, the corporate 
image had suffered badly among consumers. Arla lost one in eight 
customers virtually overnight. 
 
 
2.1    Arla’s response in terms of impression management 
 
As a crisis response, the case was not typical, in the sense that the 
response had to address a stakeholder that had not suffered any 
damage whatsoever. The customers must be won back, but they 
had never complained about the quality of the product. The issue 
was legitimacy, and hence the Arla persona’s ethos (Massey 
2001). 
Being perceived as unethical is a complex problem. Using 
attribution theory, Coombs and Holladay (2004) originally argued 
that companies chose different strategies according to the crisis 
type they were involved in, and that the most characteristic feature 
of the crisis was the amount to responsibility ascribed to the 
corporation. Thus, if there was no visible intention or volition, the 
crisis could be classed as either an accident or a case of fellow-
victim suffering. A frequently cited example is the Tylanol crisis: 
a madman tampering with bottles of pharmaceutical products was 
hardly something that the corporation could be held responsible 
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for, but it was tackled with a massive recall of the product, and 
thus Tylanol has served textbooks for years as an example of 
correct response: swift, certainly expensive, but putting an end to 
all anxiety. The more it is possible for agents to predict (“they 
should have known this could happen”), the more the public is 
likely to blame them for carelessness. Similarly, the more possible 
risk a case involves, the more the public will blame agents for 
arrogance (“they don’t care about risks to users”). Finally, if there 
is a history – they have done it before – then the public will be 
quick to judge.  
This means that types of crises where the company can class 
itself as a fellow victim are reasonably safe, as are types that can 
be classed as accidents. Misbehaviour, however, is different. Arla 
had misbehaved and was held responsible; the incident could not 
be treated as an accident or a careless slip. Apologia was called 
for; but in this case, speakers on behalf of the company seem to 
have used all available response categories over a period of time.  
Apology was out of the question. With a court case pending, it 
was impossible for Arla to apologize in public, even if it had 
wanted to. However, as the campaign was rolled out, the company 
really did try to redress past wrongs by seeking collaboration with 
small organic dairies e.g. over common advertising of organic 
milk and a common system of transportation crates for milk 
cartons. Arla also published a large and thorough ethical 
manifesto (called “Our responsibility”) on its website, addressing 
issues of animal welfare and relations with other dairies. Since 
Arla was interesting to the press, this initiative was also covered 
and well received, and in all probability this display of good will 
was the single biggest factor in normalising relations with 
customers. 
Excuses were limited to the denial of intention and volition by 
the company. Arla claimed that the Hirtshals incident happened 
without the knowledge of top management. In acute crises where 
the figure of the CEO is central, a manager may indeed be seen to 
take the responsibility, but, as it has been noted by Hearit, among 
other scholars, this is normally seen as purely symbolic. If a bank 
or airline crashes, no-one expects the CEO to commit hara-kiri; 
but when President Reagan declared that “angry as I may be about 
[the dealings that went on at the White House in the Iran-Contra 
scandal]…, it is still my responsibility”, it produced headlines 
hailing the chief as a man who did not shirk his responsibility. In 
Arla’s case, the responsibility issue was subdivided, and dealt 
with as differentiation: the two salespersons who forced the 
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exclusion of the Hirtshals dairy were presented as solely 
responsible. 
Further justification was offered concerning the accusations 
about unfair treatment of organic milk producers: Arla’s 
procedure was simply normal practice in the face of over-
production. 
Finally, denial was the basis of the defence: what Arla had 
done was offering the wholesaler, Metro, a marketing subsidy in 
connection with their 40th anniversary, which is normal practice 
and legal. Therefore, there was no case against Arla. 
On the positive or assertive front, Arla set out to win 
sympathy. For one thing, the case was framed, not as the story of 
a big (monopoly) player squashing a small one, but as yet another 
small player in a struggle for survival in an increasingly 
competitive market, with the mighty German producers just south 
of the border as the looming threat. Coombs calls this strategy 
suffering: as a victim defending itself, Arla’s general behaviour 
was lifted up into another story. 
But first and foremost, the company engaged in serious, 
concerted ingratiation. On the self-boosting side, Arla developed 
a large quality manifesto, corresponding to its ethical manifesto, 
called “The Arla Farm”, where the company could be seen to be 
taking care of all sorts of social responsibilities. This classic 
bolstering move served to replace the image of the cynical 
monopoly. More efficient, however, was the effort to be useful to 
the customers, providing recipes, advice, inspiration and an 
interactive forum to be heard in for customers who wanted to 
voice opinions. This was the creation of the Arla Forum, the web-
based hub of the image restoration campaign. The choice bore out 
the tenet that the web is an indispensable tool for changing the 
public’s view of the past, and shaping their interpretations of 
future actions (Tucker & Melewar 2005). 
 
 
2.2    The website: the many faces of Arla 
 
The establishment of the Arla Forum on the web was announced 
with full-page advertisements in the Danish newspapers. They 
contained an open letter from the then CEO, Åke Modig, about 
the company’s earnest wish to be seen as open and helpful and 
engaging in dialogue with the consumers – a move which was to 
be expected in this sort of campaign – and a very large photograph 
of the handsome CEO in a jaunty windbreaker with his arm round 
the neck of a photogenic cow with an ear-tag, which was perhaps 
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rather a new development. The connection with “nature” has 
become a trademark: annual reports have since featured the 
traditional group photos of board members in green fields 
(without the cow, however). 
The customer website is different from the corporate website 
of Arla Foods, which contains the corporate material like reports, 
press releases, visions and missions, the manifestos etc. The 
consumer site is kept red and white, Danish national colours and 
traditionally used by Karoline, the sweetly naïve, flower-
munching, tablecloth-chequered cardboard cow that was the 
trademark of the “old” dairy company and instantly recognizable 
to the Danish public. However, the most striking feature of the 
web page, at its introduction, was the number of faces with 
names: real people. This, too, has remained after the successful 
image restoration campaign.  
From its launch, the restoration home page consisted of a tight 
collection of clusters, i.e. local groupings of multi-media items, 
e.g. pictures, captions, links to other fora, video clips etc. The 
busy website was characterised by semiotic cascades, i.e. the 
progressive integration of layered multiplying potential (Baldry 
and Thibault 2006). This is a feature that is shared with many 
large companies that use their website to nurture customer 
relations and present their products in an active way, to get the 
customer to “spend time with the brand”; what was special in this 
case was that practically all clusters had not just pictures, but 
faces in them. 
For example, the provision of recipes was clearly seen as an 
important service, and the archive quickly became very widely 
used, according to the annual reports. But even the recipes had 
names and faces: there was a Cook of the Month, and he or she 
was introduced with family photographs and a short bio-note; the 
recipes had a personal touch with an authentic first-person 
narrative voice. Another group of faces belonged to the 
company’s guides for visitors. The website was (and is) also an 
interactive channel that arranges for visits to farms and dairies, 
and here prospective visitors could “meet” the guides on the web, 
for the link was accompanied by a group photo of uniformed 
people looking enthusiastic. 
The traditional marketing function of a customer website is to 
showcase new products, and as the Arla campaign was rolled out, 
new products were given room on the page; but the cluster also 
contained links to video clips of the television commercials that 
were produced at the time. These films had a common schedule: 
they were introduced by an authentic, young female production 
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manager from the headquarters in Aarhus, who was filmed talking 
to the people behind the new product. Thus the commercial for the 
new “regional milk”, a product that was supposed to give 
customers a sense of product-with-a-history, was a conversation 
between the manager and a middle-aged dairy farmer woman 
walking through the landscape where the cows were grazing in the 
southern Jutland salty marshes, talking about milk and a sense of 
belonging. Since most milk is bought by women shoppers, most 
of whom have jobs, there was a strong invitation to identify with 
the two professional women, who projected a sense of caring for 
their work and what they produced. 
Finally and most noteworthy, the new Arla website introduced 
a Forum for dialogue. The vast majority of questions asked 
concerned milk, yoghurt and other products, but some also 
concerned the corporation and (particularly at the beginning) its 
unacceptable behaviour. All, even highly critical and apparently 
unscreened comments, received courteous answers, and the 
company evidently took the opportunity to explain, justify and re-
frame the story in their answers. For a treatment of this aspect, see 
Bülow-Møller (2007). 
The forum also contained very early examples of corporate 
blogs in Denmark, and again, this medium produced an 
exceptional sense of closeness and authenticity in the customer 
communication. Authentic people with dairy-related jobs blogged 
about aspects of interest to the customer. Thus the resident cook, a 
personable blonde woman, blogged about seasonal recipes and the 
developments in the experimental Arla kitchen, and the health 
consultant wrote about health and well-being, particularly about 
children’s needs; there was a common-interest blog from a farm in 
Jutland, describing daily life for a milk producer, and there were 
no less than two corporate blogs from the staff, one from the press 
officer and one from the personel manager, discussing the image 
of Arla in the press. This wealth of inside information was unique 
and merits further attention; it is arguable that the aim was to shift 
this part of the website from a communications-based network to 
an affinity-based network, i.e. to create a different and more 
affective kind of interest in the community of users (Raghavan 
2006). 
The farm blog, called “Life on Brook Farm”, was introduced 
as “Inge and Mikael’s blog”, despite the fact that only the 
husband, Mikael, actually wrote. In translation, the introductory 
paragraph runs, 
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We are Inge og Mikael Nørby Lassen, and we have a farm 
near Ribe with 200 brindled cows. Mikael has been in the 
co-operative since 1997. In our blog you can read about 
life on the farm and my comments on stories in the press 
about Arla. 
 
The impression that the reader gets of Mikael is that of an 
opinionated professional who has little respect for stories in the 
press (ill-founded if you know enough about dairy production) 
and for sentimental and uninformed views on animal husbandry. 
The very first contribution on the blog was sparked by a 
inaccurate press story about unproductive cows, “loser cows”, and 
a letter to one of the newpapers from a city dweller that 
recommended tender care for the unfortunate cows, cited by 
Mikael (in translation) as Go and put an arm lovingly around the 
cow’s neck and scratch its ears and pat it. Unless it has some 
disease, I think that will do it good. This quotation is followed by 
the comment “That solution is reeeally a bit far out”, and a 
snapshot of a man patting a cow’s hind quarters, with the caption 
“Here’s our herdsman trying out the theory ”. Characteristically, 
the answering comments were all from farmers, agreeing that 
romanticised images of country life is a problem. But in the 
annual report following the image restoration campaign, it was 
this blog that was mentioned, as a successful attempt to bridge the 
gap between producers and customers. Mikael’s efforts as an 
authentic professional were felt to be sincerely innovative. 
The two corporate blogs were written by the man most in the 
public eye, the press officer (Honoré), whose blog was called 
“Between the lines”, and one of the architects behind the forum 
(Møller), whose blog, “Considerations”, dealt with internal 
matters. In these two cases, the corporation was directly 
represented by named people with personal opinions talking 
more-or-less spontaneously to the stakeholders about what 
concerned them: misrepresentation in the press (which could 
fortunately be rectified now that there was a forum where Arla 
could answer back and tell the true story), and the joys and set-
backs for the staff working for the company (not always an easy 
place to work, since the unfairly tarnished public image saddened 
the employees). In the same way as fellow farmers were indirectly 
addressed by Mikael, the corporate blogs presumably served as 
internal morale-boosting for Arla employees, while also 
presenting a front to external stakeholders. 
The following is an early example of Arla’s distinctive brand 
of meta-communication. Honoré cites an interview in the media 
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section of the business newspaper Børsen, where one of the 
largest PR consultants in the country had called the new Arla 
campaign overkill: … all at once Arla is attempting every kind of 
communication with its campaign, story telling, blogging and 
dialogue on the Arla forum. Not very smart. (Børsen, 9.11.05). 
Honoré is baffled, for the consultant has not explained why:  
 
Is it not very smart to blog in Arla’s situation? Should we 
not run tv commercials where our farmers answer 
questions from the consumers? Or is it stupid to offer 
dialogue with Arla’s staff and cooperative partners on the 
Arla Forum? If anyone has an idea about this, I’m 
listening! (Between the lines, 09.11.2005) 
 
It is not normal for a corporation to discuss its own media strategy 
with the stakeholders who are supposed to be influenced by it. It 
does, however, feel surprisingly genuine and engenders a 
remarkable sense of closeness. Far from a faceless and cynical 
monopoly, the Arla website puts on stage a large group of 
everyday people engaged in producing the best product they can, 
and interested in talking to everyone who wants to talk about their 
concerns. 
 
 
3. Image restoration: the factors 
 
As it will have transpired, Arla did much more than just explain. 
For many stakeholders, Arla succeeded in transferring its 
version of events, and in moving the focus from the past to the 
present and future, so that its own framing became the shared 
version. 
In terms of ethos, Arla came out of the crisis with a persona 
with a much higher end status (or “terminal ethos”, if the 
campaign is seen as a speech, where the rhetor’s personal 
standing with the audience shifts as he or she goes along). 
Traditionally in rhetoric, ethos is measured as a function of the 
rhetor’s perceived expertness, trustworthiness, good will, 
sociability, sincerity and subscription to values that are held in 
common with the audience (see for example McCroskey 2001). 
We have seen the efforts that Arla made to prove that they could 
produce expert knowledge about any consumer concern related 
to dairy products, and their good will was documented in the 
very open forum, where even the harshest criticism was 
published and acknowledged. The hefty documents of ethical 
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standards and quality guarantees vouched for sincerity, and 
finally, there were extraordinary efforts to share concerns with 
customers and other stakeholders like fellow cooperative 
producers, in the blogs. The sense of shared concerns invited 
identification, and hence shared values. By 2006, Arla was one 
of us. 
In terms of story, Arla had not quite supplanted the story of 
the monopoly squashing the small dairy, but it had certainly 
launched a competing story with a different role distribution (a 
strategy recommended by Heath 2004). To start with, Arla was 
not a villain; rather, the company was embarrassed by a couple 
of over-eager representatives, who had not done anything illegal 
in giving Metro an anniversary marketing contribution and 
perhaps indirectly suggesting that a little quid-pro-quo would be 
highly acceptable – regrettable but certainly not villainous. 
Later, as the campaign unrolled, the story was supplemented 
with Arla in the role of hero: small dairies found a protective 
friend eager and willing to help with common initiatives, e.g. 
events like “the Cows’ Dancing Day”, the day in April when all 
the organic cows (by agreement) are let out into the pastures 
from their winter stables, common advertisement for organic 
milk etc. Finally, Arla positioned itself as the defender of 
Danish milk in Danish glasses, with the invention of a role that 
was not in the original story, viz. the brutal competition from 
Europe. The press accepted a large part of the story, possibly 
under influence of the detailed refutations that earlier, more 
sinister press stories had received on the Arla web, but certainly 
also because there were manifest initiatives to write about. 
In terms of voice, Arla took a novel path. Handbooks in 
corporate communication regularly mention the importance of the 
corporation speaking with one voice (e.g. Fombrun and van Riel 
2003). The corporation cannot survive a multitude of different 
voices saying different things: the persona simply shatters. But in 
Arla’s case, the one-voice strategy was not interpreted as one 
spokesman, like the press officer. Rather, it was conceived as a 
chorus of different voices emanating from assorted managers, 
employees, producers, nutrition experts, and cooks; with such a 
multitude of individual opinions on subjects like milking by robot 
or faulty press reports of the sugar content in ready-made cocoa, 
the audience was likely to lose the sense of careful staging or 
orchestration.  
The fact that no voice, at any time, produced an opinion that 
ran counter to the official new caring persona, is quite hard to 
remember. The threat that textbooks warn against is that of 
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internal dissent, where the audience has access to critical opinions 
about the corporation, coming from the inside, especially as 
shared on blogs (Ihator 2001). This situation damages credibility, 
and it was never an issue in the Arla campaign. If there was any 
dissent from the inside, it was not posted on the web or given 
vent in the press. 
 
 
3.1. Attribution 
 
Lastly, image restoration depends on what happened to the 
receivers’ original attribution of responsibility. In this case I 
shall argue that the perception of responsibility, and hence guilt, 
probably did not change a great deal, but that all the other 
factors mentioned above served to make the original unethical 
act recede. In fact, there is another aspect of attribution theory 
that has even more explanatory value here, viz. that of the 
fundamental attribution error. Psychologists find as a very 
robust result that people judge responsibility differently 
depending on whether the event was triggered by a member of 
their in-group or an out-group, and the observation has been 
transferred e.g. to negotiation interaction, but not to public 
relations (for overview of attribution theory, see Ross and 
Nisbett 1991, Martinko 1995). 
The standard attribution scheme hinges on the division 
between personal characteristics and situational factors. If A 
crashes his car, attribution of guilt will be influenced on whether 
he is known to drive too fast or known to be a very careful 
driver (history), and on whether other people crashed that night 
on that road because of snow, or it was a perfectly 
straightforward drive (distinctiveness). In the case of a reckless 
driver, people will be more prone to attribute the accident to his 
personal characteristics. In the case of a careful driver, 
conversely, they will be more likely to look for situational 
factors that could have created the accident. If it is known to be 
a dangerous spot, and the weather was bad, there is more 
likelihood that people will attribute the accident to situational 
factors; if no such excuse is present, they will attribute the 
accident to personal factors (unskilled driving). This is the basis 
for the insights about the public ascribing responsibility in 
Coombs and Holladay 2004, and Coombs 2007. 
However, this tendency is overridden when people are 
personally involved. Members of their in-group, like family or 
friends, regularly benefit from the doubt. Thus the default 
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attribution, even in perfect weather conditions, will be to 
situational factors: we know that our friends are reasonable 
people, they really would not have driven recklessly, so there 
must be another explanation.  
On the other hand, out-groups are suspect; the default 
attribution, even in heavy snow, is to personal characteristics. 
Thus we assume, without thinking about it, that people who 
differ from ourselves in some salient way are probably lousy 
drivers. This tendency to under-estimate situational factors in 
case of out-groups, and over-estimate them for in-groups, is 
known as the fundamental attribution error. 
If attribution theory can serve to explain receiver reactions, 
surely this aspect is crucial, and should be added to the insights 
that Coombs and his colleagues draw on when they proclaim 
that the theory represents the next step after the case 
descriptions of post-crisis communication (Coombs 2007). It is 
arguable that what happened in Arla’s image restoration 
campaign was that they succeeded in creating affinity or even 
identification with stakeholders. People who used the website or 
watched the commercials got to know them almost personally; 
instead of a faceless monopoly, we got a company who 
employed dairy farmers and product managers with Jutland 
accents and a sense of humour. The result was that the division 
between Arla and us-stakeholders-who-thought-Arla-unethical, 
and therefore out-group, was replaced. We came to think of the 
bloggers and cooks and farmers and their friends and colleagues 
as in-group. In retrospect, that meant that we no longer judged 
so harshly when we thought about the Hirtshals case: there were 
probably situational factors involved as well. 
Corporate apologia, then, must be seen as a complex set of 
factors – a response that consists of several initiatives, some 
immediately after the crisis, and some that become appropriate 
over time, initiated by feedback from stakeholders. It is 
therefore almost always too simple to recommend one kind of 
response, even if a company wants to aim for the one-voice 
strategy. However, the image restoration can be left alone once 
the stakeholder response has stopped being salient, i.e. when 
they no longer think about the legitimacy issue. At that point, 
going on saying you are sorry will be counter-productive. With 
luck, the corporation will have learnt that having a history is a 
liability, and that it may be more cost-effective to be known for 
human kindness. 
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